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I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is a worker's compensation case filed on behalf of Su Warren on August 9, 2010. 
The industrial accident that gave rise to the filing of the within lawsuit occurred on January 23, 
2007. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS: 
On February 16, 2011, Defendants requested the Industrial Commission calendar a 
hearing on issues of: 
1. Whether the condition for which benefits are claimed was caused by an accident 
arising out of and in the course of Claimant's employment; 
2. Impairment; 
3. Disability; 
4. Apportionment; and 
5. Whether Claimant's condition is attributable in whole or in part to a preexisting 
injury or condition. 
On March 16,2011, the Commission issued a Notice of Hearing calendaring issues for 
hearing on August 16, 2011. On June 30, 2011, Defendants filed a Motion to Vacate and Reset 
Hearing on the grounds that Claimant underwent a psychological evaluation on May 20, 2011, 
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and more testing was scheduled for August 3 or August 4, 2011, which needed to be completed 
before the hearing. The Commission entered an Order vacating the August 16, 2011, hearing on 
July 8, 2011. Defendants filed another Request for Calendaring on August 1, 2011. Claimant 
filed a response indicating Claimant needed continued care and treatment with a 
neuropsychologist and a surgical consult. Defendants filed their reply stating that there was 
nothing going on in the case except for receipt of Defendants' neuropsychological report and 
Claimant was employed full time as the City Clerk with the City of Ponderay. The Appellant 
filed Claimant's Response to Request for Calendaring dated August 11,2011, stating, "It is 
anticipated that the case will be ready for hearing in February 2012 and thereafter." On 
September 30, 2011, the Commission issued an Order calendaring a hearing for March 27,2012. 
On March 16, 2012, Claimant filed a Motion to Vacate Hearing arguing Claimant has undergone 
a neuropsychological evaluation and has yet to receive a finalized report. Claimant claimed she 
was in need of said report and her doctors' updated plan of care before a hearing and/or 
mediation is rescheduled. Defendants objected to vacation on the grounds there was no basis for 
Claimant's motion, noting that the neuropsychological evaluation was completed on August 12, 
2011, and Claimant had refused to accept the Surety's offer to send Claimant to a chronic pain 
management program; therefore, nothing was going on in the case. The Commission held a 
telephonic hearing on March 21, 2012, and entered an Order of March 22,2012, vacating the 
March 27, 2{)12, hearing and resetting it for May 10,2012. Claimant filed another Motion to 
Vacate Hearing on May 4,2012. On May 4,2012, the Commission entered an Order denying the 
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motion. The matter was heard on May 10,2012, by the Commission, Referee Douglas A. 
Donahue ("Referee"), in Coeur d' Alene, Idaho. On March 4,2013, the Referee submitted his 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Recommendation to the Commission. Agency's 
Record, p. 71. 
On March 27,2013, the Commission entered an Order approving, confirming and 
adopting the Referee's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and ordered that: 
1. Claimant i~ured her neck as a result of the work accident. 
2. Claimant is entitled to TTD/TPD during the period of recovery. 
3. Claimant is entitled to medical care received, related to the accident, through 
December 23, 2008. 
4. Claimant has not shown her entitlement to medical care in the form of a pain 
management program. 
5. Claimant is entitled to PPI rated at 5% of the whole person. 
6. Claimant failed to show it likely she is entitled to permanent disability in excess 
ofPPI. 
7. Claimant failed to show entitlement to retraining benefits. 
8. Claimant failed to show a basis for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§72-804. 
9. Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-718, this decision is final and conclusive as to all 
matters adjudicated. R., pp. 88-89. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS: 
The Commission made the following findings of fact: 
The Accident 
1. On January 23, 2007, Claimant was seated in a wheeled office chair at her desk 
at work. A vehicle outside the building struck the wall near the desk. Claimant 
and the chair were propelled across the room by a combination ofthe force of the 
vehicle which struck the wall which struck the desk which struck the chair and of 
Claimant's surprised physical reaction to the accident. 
2. Although the building was significantly damaged at the point of impact, the car 
did not actually break through the wall into the interior of the building. Claimant's 
exhibit 15 contains photographs of the vehicle and wall after the accident. These 
provide some perspective on the forces involved in the accident. 
3. Claimant's employment was terminated on March 13,2007. Although 
Employer claimed Claimant's performance had suddenly deteriorated more than 
four months before the work accident, none of this was documented before the 
accident. Claimant had worked for Employer since October 2003. 
Post-Accident Medical Care 
4. Claimant immediately sought medical care. Claimant initially complained of 
dizziness, left facial pain and left hand pain. X-rays of her left wrist and hand 
were negative. Scott Burgstahler, M.D., who had been Claimant's primary treating 
physician for a decade, treated her. He noted her primary complaint related to her 
left hand. He also noted some "subtle evidence" for cognitive impairment or 
decreased concentration ability. 
5. Claimant attended four chiropractic visits between the date of the accident and 
the end of February 2007. 
6. A CT scan on Claimant's head was taken one week later, on January 30. It 
showed no abnormality. 
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7. By the time of a February 9,2007, follow-up visit, Dr. Burgstahler opined 
Claimant had "recovered nearly fully" despite a "huge list of symptoms" and 
recommended "a little bit" of physical therapy for her left shoulder. 
8. Physical therapy began February 12,2007. Claimant reported some left neck 
and shoulder pain, with lesser pain in her thoracic and lumbar spine. She reported 
her headaches from the accident had subsided. The therapist noted poor posture, 
diminished range of motion with pain on motion, and Claimant's report of early 
morning neurological symptoms in her left arm. On another visit, Claimant 
reported continuing headaches and some short-term memory loss. Claimant was 
given exercises and taught about posture and ergonomics. Claimant reported that 
she fell on March 1 and that she felt better afterward. Overall, Claimant's 
symptoms waxed and waned throughout physical therapy. By March 15, Claimant 
had improved substantially and was discharged from physical therapy. 
9. On June 9, 2007, Claimant reported some paresthesias in her hands and thumbs 
bilaterally. Despite the lack of objective findings on examination, Dr. Burgstahler 
recommended an MRI. 
10. On July 13,2007, Claimant underwent a C-spine MRI. It showed mild bony 
narrowing at C3-4 and a small degenerative disc protrusion at C5-6, neither of 
which could be correlated to her complaints. 
11. On August 13,2007, neurosurgeon Jeffrey McDonald, M.D., examined 
Claimant. He noted diminished sensation in Claimant's first finger on the right, 
but no other atypical findings on examination. He noted a C-spine MRI showed a 
"moderately large" disk herniation at C5-6 with a probable annular tear. He noted 
that he viewed this MRI abnormality to be more substantial than the radiologist'S 
description. He opined Claimant's symptoms to be consistent with and 
explainable by the observed disk condition. He recommended surgery. 
12. On September 4, 2007, Claimant underwent an anterior cervical diskectomy 
and fusion at C5-6. Dr. McDonald and his nurse practitioner Tawnya Bowman 
provided follow-up care. Physical therapy was recommended to aid in reducing 
post-surgical pain complaints. 
13. Claimant's X-rays six months after surgery showed good stability and 
alignment. This was confirmed by a CT scan one week after the X-rays. Dr. 
McDonald noted that the fusion was "incompletely ossified" although it appeared 
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to be healing without unwanted motion or instability. He remained concerned 
about her pain and loss of range of motion. 
14. In January 2008, Dr. McDonald prescribed a TENS unit to ameliorate 
Claimant's continuing pain. 
15. On May 12,2008, Claimant reported generalized fatigue and neck pain. Dr. 
Burgstahler diagnosed "fatigue, myalgias, following a cadaveric bone grafting." 
Dr. Burgstahler's records do not identify another visit for nearly one year, until 
April 30, 2009. 
16. On June 19,2008, Claimant reported significant improvement albeit with 
some residual muscle tightness. Three months' use of a bone stimulator had been 
helpful. 
Motorcycle Accident and Medical Care 
17. On June 29, 2008, Claimant was involved in an accident in which a 
motorcycle hit a deer. Claimant was a passenger on the motorcycle which was 
driven by her companion, Mr. Brown. She was not wearing a helmet. In that 
accident, she dislocated her left shoulder, broke bones in her left leg, and suffered 
several scrapes, lacerations, and bruises. 
18. Upon hospitalization after the motorcycle accident, Claimant "denie[d] 
headache, neck pain, difficulty breathing, chest pain, abdominal pain, vomiting." 
X-rays showed no fractures of her pelvis or hip joints. The emergency room 
examination noted "Neck is nontender. Painless range of motion." No evidence 
of trauma to Claimant's head was found. Dr. DiBenedetto, on examination, stated, 
"By the way she has a neurovascularly intact left upper extremity with all motion 
of the fingers. She has intact sensation of her lateral deltoid and over the biceps." 
19. Also on June 29, 2008, a left shoulder X-ray after a reduction of Claimant's 
shoulder dislocation showed appropriate alignment. Comminuted fractures of the 
tibia and fibula were surgically repaired. Both procedures were performed by Dr. 
DiBenedetto. He also repaired an ankle fracture. 
20. On August 1, 2008, Dr. DiBenedetto examined Claimant and her major 
complaint was loss of strength and range of motion in her left arm. She reported 
pain like she "has never had" before. 
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21. Also on August 1, 2008, Dr. McDonald provided a follow-up examination. 
Claimant was continuing to use the bone stimulator. She reported no neck or 
upper extremity symptoms. She reported the intervening motorcycle accident and 
left shoulder dislocation. X-rays showed the ossification remained incomplete, but 
alignment and stability remained good. 
22. On August 14,2008, Claimant's left shoulder MRI showed healing from 
trauma and a full thickness tear of the anterior supraspinatus tendon. Dr. 
DiBenedetto provided follow-up care of her tom rotator cuff. 
23. On September 23,2008, Dr. DiBenedetto repaired Claimant's tom rotator 
cuff. Bruce Demko, CRNA, performed a left interscalene block for postoperative 
pain management. Dr. DiBenedetto opined that the rotator cuff repair was made 
necessary by the motorcycle accident. 
24. On October 28, 2008, a C-spine X-ray showed no problem with the alignment 
or condition of Claimant's neck or the fusion appliances. 
25. Physical therapy was recommended, but Claimant declined because of her 
lack of health insurance and inability to payout of pocket. 
Additional Medical Care 
26. On October 30, 2008, Dr. McDonald recommended Claimant discontinue use 
of the bone stimulator. Claimant reported dramatic improvement had occurred 
since August. 
27. On December 23,2008, physiatrist J. Craig Stevens, M.D., evaluated and 
examined Claimant's condition at the request of Defendants. He opined Claimant 
suffered a cervical disk herniation as a result of the work accident. He opined she 
was fixed and stable on the date of this examination. He opined she suffered 
permanent partial impairment rated at 5% of the whole person as a result of the 
injury, surgery, and continuing subjective complaints of non verifiable mild 
residual radiculopathy. He did not recommend specific work restrictions. 
28. On April 30,2009, Claimant returned to Dr. Burgstahler. She complained that 
"her neck really hasn't been right ever since" the work accident and fusion 
surgery. Claimant informed Dr. Burgstahler that she "was rated for disability at 
5% and she is convinced that her disability is significantly higher than that." Dr. 
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Burgstahler okayed a referral to neurosurgeon John Demakas, M.D., who had 
been recommended by Claimant's attorney. 
29. June through November 2009, Claimant underwent acupuncture with Mika 
Tsongas. Claimant has embraced other nontraditional therapeutic options as she 
has attempted to recover from her injuries. 
30. On October 20,2009, Dr. Burgstahler recorded Claimant's representation that 
she believes she has shown "a little dysphoria" with reduced cognitive awareness 
since the work accident. This despite her satisfactory performance in her new job 
as county clerk in Ponderay. 
31. Dr. Demakas performed a consultation with Claimant. He agreed Claimant's 
fusion looked "fine." 
32. On December 3, 2009, Claimant's C-spine MRI showed minimal degenerative 
changes at levels other than the stable fusion. 
33. On April 9, 2010, Dr. McDonald responded to correspondence from Surety. 
He disputed Claimant's report to Dr. Burgstahler that her neck had never really 
improved. He recited his historical record of visits which showed Claimant had 
almost completely improved by at least August or September 2008. He opined his 
concurrence with Dr. Stevens' IME of December 2008. He opined December 
2009 MRI findings showed no new problem or change in her neck condition. 
34. On May 20,2011 and again on August 5, 2011, Craig Beaver, Ph.D., 
evaluated and examined Claimant's mental and psychological status at the request 
of Defendants. The first evaluation dealt primarily with emotional issues. The 
second evaluation dealt primarily with Claimant's assertions of diminished 
cognitive functioning. 
35. Ofthe four tests which, in part, measure a patient's magnifying or 
overreporting of mental or cognitive symptoms, three indicated Claimant was 
consciously or unconsciously overreporting her symptoms. One indicated no such 
overreporting. Dr. Beaver opined that Claimant's overreporting of symptoms was 
not done on an intentional basis. 
36. Dr. Beaver diagnosed Claimant as qualifying for the following psychological 
diagnoses: 
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a. Dysthymic Disorder, 
b. Pain disorder associated with psychological factors and medical 
condition, 
c. Adjustment disorder with anxious mood. 
37. Although Dr. Beaver thought Claimant met some of the criteria for PTSD, she 
ultimately did not qualifY for this diagnosis. As well, although Dr. Beaver 
considered whether Claimant warranted a personality disorder diagnosis, he 
ultimately concluded that she merely had somatization tendencies. Dr. Beaver did 
not opine that the subject accident was the predominant cause of Claimant's 
somatization tendencies. (Emphasis supplied.) 
38. Concerning Claimant's Axis 1 diagnoses, Dr. Beaver felt that although the 
subject accident did contribute, in some respect, to the three diagnoses he made, 
he clearly expressed his view that the subject accident was not the predominant 
cause, as compared to all other causes combined, of the three psychological 
diagnoses. According to Dr. Beaver, the work accident made its most significant 
contribution to Claimant's diagnosis of adjustment disorder with anxious mood. 
His report reflects that 50% of the cause of this diagnosis is referable to the 
subject accident. (Emphasis supplied.) 
39. Dr. Beaver also testified that the three psychological diagnoses he entertained 
were not significant enough to warrant either impairment ratings or restrictions. 
He noted that Claimant appeared to be functioning well in her new position with 
the City of Ponderay, her psychological diagnoses notwithstanding. 
40. Dr. Beaver did testifY that Claimant might benefit from a chronic pain 
management program as part of an effort to resolve some of Claimant's pain 
complaints related to her psychological pain disorder. Explaining the substance of 
a chronic pain management program, Dr. Beaver testified that one of the aims of 
such a program is to improve a person's function by employing strategies to 
reduce pain. 
41. In accordance with his opinion that Claimant's pain disorder was only partly, 
but not predominantly, related to the subject accident, Dr. Beaver testified that the 
need for the chronic pain management program was only partly related to the 
subject accident. (Emphasis supplied.) 
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Other History and Prior Medical Care 
42. Claimant received occasional medical care through Bonner General Hospital 
from 1986 through 1994. These records are only partially legible. They do not 
appear to record any fact relevant to Claimant's head or neck. 
43. Episodes oftreatment for depression or anxiety or both appear occasionally in 
the pre-accident records. 
44. Claimant visited chiropractor Gregory Dutson, D.C., for neck and upper back 
pain. The chiropractor's notes show one visit in 1996, one in 1998, two in 2004, 
two in 2005, and two in 2006. The last pre-accident visit occurred on November 
20,2006. 
45. Claimant first visited Dr. Burgstahler in April 1997 for a cough and sinus 
symptoms. He has been her primary treating physician since that time. 
46. In 1999, Claimant injured her left foot, knee and left shoulder in a bike 
accident. Only symptoms of foot pain persisted; the rest resolved quickly. 
47. In November 2000, Claimant's lumbar X-ray showed degenerative problems 
with retrolisthesis. She complained of back pain with L5 radiculopathy down the 
right leg. A Lumbar MRI identified mild disc bulges and some straightening of 
normal curvature in an otherwise negative scan. Also in November 2000, an upper 
GI scan showed a small hiatal hernia which was exacerbating some reflux 
symptoms. 
48. In May 2002, Claimant's appendix was removed. 
49. On March 2003, Claimant was hospitalized briefly for symptoms which were 
diagnosed as sinusitis. Also noted among the records for this visit was a complaint 
of continuing occasional low back pain. 
50. In May 2006, Dr. Burgstahler treated Claimant for fatigue and malaise. In 
September 2006, he treated her for respiratory tract infection and vertigo. In 
November 2006, he treated her for back and neck pain and headaches. 
Vocational Factors 
51. Bor  Claimant was 55 years of age on the date of hearing. 
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52. On the date of the accident, Claimant earned $14.00 per hour on a full-time 
basis. She worked overtime each tax season. 
53. Claimant is a high school graduate and has taken some internet courses --
bookkeeping, accounting, tax, etc. -- but has never enrolled in college. 
54. Claimant has worked as a secretary/receptionist and bookkeeper for a 
veterinary hospital. Most jobs during her life related to bookkeeping. On the date 
of hearing, she worked as a county clerk, earning $18.43 per hour plus full-time 
benefits on a 32-hour work week. Her work as county clerk involves substantial 
attention to a broad range of detail. It requires initiative in exercising judgment. 
Additionally, while county clerk, she also worked part-time for a winery. 
55. From the date of the work accident until she was terminated two months later, 
Claimant worked steadily for Employer. 
56. Claimant was evaluated by vocational expert Doug Crum. He opined Claimant 
likely suffered no loss of access to her local labor market and no loss of wage-
earning potential as a result of the work accident. 
58. Claimant appears credible at hearing. She is an average historian. She does not 
appear to be intentionally exaggerating her history or symptoms. Her testimony is 
largely consistent with the available record. Claimant has been a good and hard 
worker throughout her adult life. 
Causation 
59. A claimant has the burden of proving the condition for which compensation is 
sought is causally related to an industrial accident. Callan tine v Blue Ribbon 
Supply, 103 Idaho 734, 653 P.2d 455 (1982). Further, there must be evidence of 
medical opinion -- by way of physician's testimony or written medical record --
supporting the claim for compensation to a reasonable degree of medical 
probability. No special formula is necessary when medical opinion evidence 
plainly and unequivocally conveys a doctor's conviction that the events of an 
industrial accident and injury are causally related. Paulson v. Idaho Forest 
Industries, Inc., 99 Idaho 896, 591 P.2d 143 (1979); Roberts v. Kit Manufacturing 
Company, Inc., 124 Idaho 946, 866 P.2d 969 (1993). A claimant is required to 
establish a probable, not merely a possible, connection between cause and effect 
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to support his or her contention. Dean v. Dravo Corporation, 95 Idaho 558, 560-
61,511 P.2d 1334, 1336-37 (1973). 
60. Claimant showed it likely that she suffered a C-spine injury as a result of the 
work accident. She showed it likely that she suffered a temporary aggravation of 
underlying depression and anxiety as a result of the work accident. She showed it 
likely that she retains some persistent sensation abnormalities in her upper 
extremities, particularly certain fingers. 
61. Under Idaho Code § 72-451, psychological conditions sufficient to constitute a 
diagnosis under the DSM -IV -TR are compensable if certain conditions are 
satisfied. Of central importance, Claimant must demonstrate that the subject 
accident is the "predominant cause as compared to all other causes combined" of 
the psychological injury in question. (Idaho Code § 72-451(3)). Here, the evidence 
fails to establish causation per this elevated burden of proof; it is not disputed that 
the subject accident is, in some respect, responsible for contributing to the 
psychological diagnoses referenced by Dr. Beaver, but the evidence fails to 
establish that the subject accident is the predominant cause ofthose conditions. 
PPI and Permanent Disability 
63. Dr. Stevens is the only physician who provided a PPI rating for Claimant's 
physical condition. That rating is well supported by the evidence of record. 
Claimant suffered PPI rated at 5% of the whole person as a result of the work 
accident. 
64. Claimant failed to show she suffered permanent partial impairment of a 
mental or emotional or psychological nature as a result of the work accident. Dr. 
Beaver's assessment appears well supported by the evidence of record and is 
uncontradicted. Claimant's suggestion that she might show psychological PPI if 
given more time is unpersuasive. This accident occurred in 2007. A hearing was 
originally set for August 16, 2011, but was vacated and reset at Defendants' 
request. 
As the reset date ofthe hearing -- March 27,2012 -- approached, Claimant 
requested additional time. The case was again vacated and reset for May 10,2012. 
Claimant's belated attempts to produce evidence supporting a theory of a 
psychological injury requiring treatment and causing permanent impairment do 
not explain her failure to produce timely records. 
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68. Here, Claimant has returned to work at a more complicated and demanding 
job than her time-of-injury job. The new job pays significantly more. Also, she 
works a second job at a winery. Claimant has shown she is capable of seeking 
work, obtaining work, and working. No physical restrictions have been 
recommended. The vocational expert opined Claimant suffered no disability in 
excess ofPPI. Claimant failed to show she suffered permanent partial disability in 
excess of PPI. 
69. Claimant suggests she should be entitled to additional evaluation for PPI or 
permanent disability or both at a later date. Claimant argues that if the chronic 
pain management program improves Claimant's functional ability, then this may 
make it necessary to reevaluate Claimant's impairment/disability after the 
completion of the program. 
70. We are unpersuaded that it is necessary to defer the question of whether 
Claimant is entitled to an impairment rating for her psychological diagnoses. 
Claimant has not demonstrated that the underlying psychological condition to be 
addressed in the chronic pain management program is causally related to the 
subject accident under the standard set by Idaho Code § 72-451. Absent proof of a 
causal connection between the Claimant's alleged psychological condition and the 
subject accident, the date of medical stability for conditions causally related to the 
subject accident stands at December 23,2008. 
Medical Care 
71. An employer is required to provide reasonable medical care for a reasonable 
time. Idaho Code § 72-432(1). 
72. Claimant established that she is entitled to benefits for all medical care related 
to the work accident, received through December 23, 2008, the date of medical 
stability. Defendants are not liable for medical care related to the motorcycle 
accident. 
73. Defendants have expressed willingness to provide for certain medical care, 
including a pain management program. However, Defendants have no legal 
obligation to provide the same. 
R., pp. 73-86. 
The Commission made the following conclusions: 
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1. Claimant injured her neck as a result of the work accident; 
2. Claimant is entitled to TTD/TPD during the period of recovery; 
3. Claimant is entitled to medical care received, related to the accident, through 
December 23, 2008; 
4. Claimant has not shown her entitlement to medical care in the form of a pain 
management program; 
5. Claimant is entitled to PPI rated at 5% of the whole person; 
6. Claimant failed to show it likely she is entitled to permanent disability in 
excess of PPI; 
7. Claimant failed to show entitlement to retraining benefits; 
8. Claimant failed to show a basis for an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§ 72-804. R., p. 87. 
II. 
RESTATED ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant is entitled to whole-person 
impairment of 5% for her injuries arising from the accident of January 23,2007, is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
2. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant has not shown her 
entitlement to medical care in the form of a pain management program is supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
3. Whether the Commission's denial of Claimant's Motion to Vacate Hearing was 
an abuse of discretion. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 14 
4. Whether the Commission's denial of admission of Claimant's hearing Exhibit 2, 
pages 47 to 57, Exhibit 12, pages 48-69 and Exhibit 19 was an abuse of discretion. 
5. Whether the Commission's conclusion that Claimant is not entitled to attorney's 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 is based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
III. 
WHETHER RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL 
Respondents claim entitlement to attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.A.R. 11.1, which 
directs the Court to award expenses, including attorney fees, incurred because of an appeal not 
reasonably grounded in fact or law and filed for an improper purpose. Shriner v. Rausch, 141 
Idaho 228,232,108 P.3d 375,379 (2005). Attorney fees are awardable under I.A.R. Rule 11.1 
when a party requesting them proves (1) the other party's arguments are not well-grounded in 
fact, warranted by existing law, or made in good faith, and (2) the claims for an improper 
purpose, such as unnecessary delay or increase in the cost of litigation. Frank v. Bunker Hill Co., 
142 Idaho 126, 132, 124 P.3d 1002, 1008 (2005). 
IV. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The Court may set aside an order or award by the Commission if: (1) the Commission's 
findings of fact are not based on any substantial competent evidence; (2) the Commission has 
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acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its powers; (3) the findings of fact, order or award were 
procured by fraud; or (4) the findings of fact do not as a matter oflaw support the order or award. 
I.C. §72-732; Ewins v. Allied Sec., 138 Idaho 343, 345-46, 63 P.3d 469,471-72 (2003). The 
Court exercises free review over the Commission's legal conclusions but does not disturb factual 
findings that are supported by substantial and competent evidence. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 346, 63 
P.3d at 472. 
When hearing an appeal from a decision of the Idaho Industrial Commission, this Court 
must view the facts and all inferences therefore most favorably to the party who prevailed before 
the Commission. Garcia v. JR. Simplot Co., 115 Idaho 966, 969, 772 P.2d 173 (1989). When 
this Court reviews the Commission's factual findings, we must affirm if those findings are 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. Mapusaqa v. Red Lion Riverside Inn, 113 
Idaho 842, 748 P.2d 1372 (1987). 
In addition, it is within the Commission's province to decide what weight should be given 
to the facts presented and conclusions drawn from those facts. The Commission's conclusions on 
the weight and credibility of the evidence should not be disturbed on appeal unless they are 
clearly erroneous. Zapata v. JR. Simplot Co., 132 Idaho 513, 515, 975 P.2d 1178, 1180 (1999). 
Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla of proof, but less than a preponderance. It is 
relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. Id. 
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V. 
ARGUMENT 
A. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT CLAIMANT IS ENTITLED TO 
WHOLE PERSON IMPAIRMENT OF 5% IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
The only evidence of impainnent is from J. Craig Stevens, M.D. Claimant underwent an 
independent medical evaluation with 1. Craig Stevens, M.D., on December 23,2008. Defendants 
Ex. 2. At that time Dr. Stevens noted that Claimant does not exhibit overt features of cervical 
radiculopathy but does have a preexisting and coexisting condition of carpal tunnel syndrome. ld. 
at 066. Dr. Stevens opined Claimant was fixed and stable and detennined Claimant had a 5% 
whole person impainnent resulting from the work injury. Id. Claimant's treating neurophysician, 
Jeffrey McDonald, M.D., Ph.D., saw Claimant on October 30, 2008, and felt Claimant had a 
successful fusion and her case should be closed. Defendants Ex. 1 at 4. Claimant was released to 
full duty with no restrictions as of October 30, 2008. Id.. Dr. McDonald reviewed Dr. Stevens' 
IME and impainnent rating of December 23,2008, and stated it was perfonned correctly and his 
conclusions and findings were accurate. Id. at 1. 
Claimant underwent a psychological examination with Craig Beaver, Ph.D., on May 20, 
2011, and a neuropsychological examination on August 5, 2011. Defendants Ex. 10. After the 
first evaluation, Dr. Beaver concluded that Claimant does not warrant an impainnent rating for 
her emotional distress. Id. at 169. After his examination of August 5, 2011, Dr. Beaver further 
concluded Claimant does not warrant additional pennanent partial impainnent for her 
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anxiousness and there is not evidence to warrant permanent partial impairment for 
neurocognitive issues. Id. at 165. 
There is no other evidence on issue of impairment. 
B. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT CLAIMANT HAS NOT SHOWN 
ENTITLEMENT TO MEDICAL CARE IN THE FORM OF A PAIN 
MANAGEMENT PROGRAM IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND 
COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
Claimant underwent a psychological examination with Craig Beaver, Ph.D., on May 20, 
2011, and a neuropsychological examination on August 5,2011. Defendants Ex. 10. Dr. Beaver 
concluded Claimant had dysthymic disorder (longstanding mild depression) as well as pain 
disorder associated with psychological factors and her medical condition and some tendency 
towards somaticizing.ld. at 164. He opined that Claimant's generalized dysthymic disorder is a 
long-term difficulty that waxes and wanes in severity. It was present before the accident and 
continues to be present. It is not directly attributable to the accident of January 23,2007. Id. 
Claimant's pain disorder associated with psychological factors and medical condition was also a 
reflection of her pre-injury personality and coping style and is not directly attributable to the 
work injury of January 23,2007. Id. Dr. Beaver states Claimant's chronic pain issues are multi-
factoral, meaning she had some issues with pain before she got hurt, she had some pain issues 
after the January 2007 event although they seemed to improve nicely, and she had significant 
increase in pain after the motorcycle accident of June 2008. Deposition of Craig Beaver, Ph.D., at 
22, 11. 1-11. He felt the necessity or need for a pain management program was partially related to 
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the January 2007 event, the motorcycle accident of June 2008, Claimant's preexisting dysthymic 
disorder and Claimant's preinjury personality coping style not related to the work accident. Id. 
pp. 19-22. Based upon these facts, the Commission properly concluded that Claimant had failed 
to prove entitlement to the pain management program under Idaho Code §72-451(3) which 
mandates that the accident and injury be the predominant cause as compared to all other causes 
combined of any consequence for entitlement to benefits. I 
There is no other evidence. 
C. THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF CLAIMANT'S MOTION TO VACATE 
HEARING WAS PROPER. 
The Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying Claimant's motions to vacate. 
When reviewing a lower court or agency's discretionary decision, this Court must 
conduct a three-part inquiry to determine whether the lower court abused its discretion. "A trial 
court does not abuse its discretion if it (1) correctly perceives the issue as discretionary, (2) acts 
within the bounds of discretion and applies the correct legal standards, and (3) reaches the 
decision through an exercise ofreason." West Wood Invs., Inc. v. Acord, 141 Idaho 75,82, 106 
P.3d 401,408 (2005) (citing Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 
761, 768, 86 P.3d 475,482 (2004)). This Court will not disturb the Commission's findings of 
fact unless they are clearly erroneous and not supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
1 It is odd Claimant is raising entitlement to a pain management program as an issue when Defendants offered to 
provide that benefit to Claimant in August 2011 and Claimant refused to participate. See, Statement of Facts, ~ 73; 
R., pp. 23-31; Hr. Tr. p. 71, 1. 18 - p. 74, 1. 6. 
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Ewins, 138 Idaho at 346,63 P.3d at 472 (citing Dennis v. School Dist. No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 96, 
15 P.3d 329,331 (2000». Nevertheless, the Court exercises free review over the Commission's 
legal conclusions. Ewins, 138 Idaho at 346,63 P.3d at 472 (citing Moore v. Melaleuca, 137 
Idaho 23,26,43 P.3d 782, 785 (2002». 
The Commission addressed Claimant's multiple requests to vacate and reset hearing in its 
Order Denying Reconsideration. After a detailed procedural history, particularly focusing on 
repetitive motions to vacate hearing, the Commission noted: 
Claimant urges the Commission to vacate the decision and establish a new 
hearing, because she believes she requires additional medical care. Claimant does 
not allege fraud, nor has she produced evidence of such. Claimant's multiple 
requests to vacate and reset the hearing are perplexing. This was a denied claim, 
following a similar pattern to many litigated cases before the Commission. After 
providing initial medical care to Claimant, Defendants received medical evidence, 
timely exchanged with Claimant, which they believed showed Claimant did not 
require further care, and was stable from her industrial accident. Claimant was 
apprised of Defendants' denial well before the hearing. Claimant contested 
Defendants' denial, and requested additional medical care. 
There is no question that Claimant had the burden of establishing 
causation, and her need for medical care, impairment, and disability. The parties 
were unable to resolve the matter through mediation or a lump sum settlement. A 
hearing before the Commission was the correct avenue to adjudicate Claimant's 
request for medical care and whether or not she has reached a point of medical 
stability. While Claimant had the burden of establishing her need for the requested 
medical care, impairment, and disability, she appears to have either expected 
Defendants' to develop the expert medical testimony necessary for her to prevail, 
or have the Commission indefinitely postpone the ultimate resolution of the case. 
This, the Commission could not do. Claimant has not shown that the 
Commission's decision and order should be vacated. (Emphasis supplied.) 
R., pp. 101-102. 
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The Commission perceived the motions to vacate as discretionary. The Commission 
vacated and reset the hearing on multiple occasions. In this regard, the Commission stated: 
However, Claimant argues that she was prematurely forced to hearing, 
without the opportunity to obtain medical care or reach medical stability. 
Defendants argue that Claimant's strategy has been to delay the resolution of the 
case. Claimant was aware she had the burden of producing evidence to support 
her claim for medical care and stability, and had multiple opportunities to do so. 
Claimant's failure to persuasively support her case is an improper reason to vacate 
the Commission's decision and order. 
The record reflects that the Commission has vacated and reset the hearing 
on multiple occasions. Claimant filed her complaint on August 9, 2010. Several 
months later, on February 16, 2011, Defendants requested a hearing. Claimant did 
not file any objection to Defendants' request, and the Referee scheduled the 
hearing for August 16,2011. On May 20,2011, Claimant had a psychological 
evaluation, which prompted Defendants to request that the August 2011 hearing 
be vacated and reset. Again, Claimant did not file an objection or response. The 
Referee vacated the August 2011 hearing, and advised the parties to submit 
available dates before the Referee would reset the hearing. 
On August 11, 2011, Defendants made a second request for hearing. On 
August 15, 2011, Claimant responded, indicating that the hearing was premature, 
because she needed a surgical consultation and medical care from a 
neuropsychologist. However, Claimant also believed the case would be ready for 
hearing "in February 2012 and thereafter." On August 18,2011, Defendants 
argued that the matter was ready to be set for hearing, because Defendants' were 
denying that further benefits were due, Claimant was employed full-time, and the 
only pending matter was exchanging Dr. Beaver's supplemental report. On 
September 30, 2011, the Referee issued a notice of hearing for March 27,2012-
one month after Claimant anticipated being prepared for hearing, and providing 
Claimant ample time to assemble medical evidence. 
On March 19,2012, eight days before the scheduled hearing, Claimant 
filed a motion to vacate the hearing, again because Claimant claimed she had no 
received her neuropsychological report, and that she needed an updated plan of 
medical care. On March 20,2012, Defendants objected to Claimant's request to 
vacate, because Dr. Beaver's neuropsychological report had already been 
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completed and provided to Claimant. Second, Defendants had denied Claimant's 
request for additional medical care based on their medical evidence; therefore a 
hearing was appropriate to test the propriety of that denial. Third, Claimant 
declined Surety's offer of a chronic pain management program on September 21, 
2011, and such care was no longer deemed efficacious. After a telephone 
conference with the parties, the Referee vacated and reset the hearing to May 20, 
2012. 
Thereafter, the parties resumed the exchange of discovery, pre-hearing 
motions, and notices of proposed exhibits. On May 4, 2012, Claimant again filed 
a request to vacate and reset the hearing. Claimant argues that she was referred for 
additional care, which Defendants denied, and that she needed a finalized report 
of her neuropsychological evaluation. That same day, the Commission denied 
Claimant's request to vacate and reset the hearing. 
At the hearing, Claimant renewed her request to vacate and reset the 
hearing. The Referee continued with the hearing, noting Claimant's objection on 
the record. On October 5, 2012, Claimant requested that the proceedings be stayed 
for three months, and then the Commission could conduct a telephone status 
conference. Claimant argued that Defendants' earlier offer of a pain management 
program would affect her impairment and disability. As discussed above, 
Defendants offered Claimant a pain management program, which Claimant 
declined in 2011. Defendants objected to Claimant's request, as Claimant 
declined the pain management program in 2011, and the medical evidence showed 
that Claimant was at MMI. The Referee denied Claimant's motion, but allowed a 
two-week extension on the briefing. The Commission's decision and order was 
filed on March 27,2013. (Emphasis supplied.) 
R., pp. 99-101. 
The Commission's patience demonstrates that it acted within the boundaries of discretion 
consistent with legal standards applicable to adjudication of disputes. The Commission reached 
the decisions by exercise of reason. The Commission provided more than ample time to prepare 
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for the hearing rescheduled to March 27,2012, as that hearing was scheduled one month after 
Claimant anticipated being prepared for hearing. Further, ample additional time was given with 
another extension to May 10, 2012. The Commission properly determined there was no logical 
reason to reset the hearing of May 10,2012, as Claimant had been given more than ample time to 
prepare and she had developed nothing further. Under the procedural and factual history, the 
denial to vacate was reasonable. 
D. THE COMMISSION'S DENIAL OF ADMISSION OF CLAIMANT'S HEARING 
EXHIBIT 2, PAGES 47-57, EXHIBIT 12, PAGES 48-69 AND EXHIBIT 19, WAS 
NOT AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-508, the Commission has the authority to promulgate and 
adopt reasonable rules and regulations involving judicial matters. "Rules and regulations as 
promulgated and adopted, if not inconsistent with law, shall be binding in the administration of 
this law." IC §72-508. Pursuant to Idaho Code §72-508 and §72-707, the Commission adopted 
the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure Under Idaho Workers' Compensation Law (l.R.P.). 
Defendants objected to admission of hearing Exhibit 2, pages 47-57, Exhibit 12, pages 48-69 and 
Exhibit 19 as untimely. Exhibit 19 was not disclosed until the day of the hearing. Exhibit 2 
pages 47-57 were disclosed two days prior to the hearing. Exhibit 12 pages 48-69 were provided 
to Defendants the day prior to the hearing. Defendants objected on the grounds that under 
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J.R.P. Rule 102 the documents were untimely and there was no showing of good cause as to why 
they could not have been obtained and disclosed earlier. In addition, Defendants objected as its 
outstanding discovery requests, which sought information contained in the proposed exhibits as 
well as production of the documents themselves, were not seasonably supplemented with said 
information and documents. Finally, because ofthis untimely disclosure Defendants would be 
prejudiced as they would not have an opportunity to have an expert testify and rebut opinions 
regarding matters contained therein. Hearing Transcript, p. 5,1. 18 - p. 6,1. 25. 
The Commission's judicial rules contain provisions which require parties to timely 
disclose the opinions of the experts on whom they intend to rely. lR.P. 7(C), relating to 
discovery, provides, in pertinent part: "Procedural matters relating to discovery, except sanctions, 
shall be controlled by the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure." 
Therefore, pursuant to this rule, the parties are expected to conduct discovery in accordance with 
the appropriate provisions of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. LR.C.P. 26(b)(1) provides that 
parties "may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the 
2 J.R.P. Rule lO.C "Exhibits" states: 
1. Unless good cause is shown to the contrary at least 10 days prior to a hearing, each party shall 
serve on all other parties complete, legible, and accurate copies of all exhibits to be offered into 
evidence at hearing, including but not limited to medical records. The proposed exhibits shall be 
arranged in chronological order with the fIrst exhibit as the earliest date proceeding to the latest 
date. All pages within each exhibit shall be numbered in consecutive order. Each party shall fIle a 
notice with the Commission that service of such exhibits has been completed. 
2. In the event that the existence of a proposed exhibit is discovered in good faith and with due 
diligence less than 10 days before the date of hearing, the party discovering the same shall 
immediately notifY all other parties of the existence of the exhibit. The party shall also serve a 
complete, legible and accurate copy of the exhibit on all other parties, and fIle with the Industrial 
Commission a notice indicating the proposed exhibit has been served. 
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subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the 
party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party." Regarding expert opinions, 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) established that "discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts ... 
acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained by interrogatory 
and/or deposition," including a "complete statement of all opinions to be expressed and the basis 
and reasons therefore; the data or other information considered by the witness in forming the 
opinions [and] any exhibits to be used as a summary of or support for the opinions." 
Thus, Rule 26 "unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to supplement responses to 
discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an expert's testimony." Duspiva v. 
Fillmore, 293 P.3d 651 (2013), citing Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 
897,900 (1991). However, the decision whether to exclude undisclosed expert testimony is 
"committed to the sound discretion of the trial court," or here, the Commission. Id. citing 
Schmechelv. Dille, 148 Idaho 176, 180,210P.3d 1192, 1196(2009). In considering how to 
exercise its discretion, the Commission should act within the "outer boundaries of its discretion 
and consistently with the legal standard applicable to the specific choices available." See Id. 
citing Sirius LC v. Erickson, 150 Idaho 80, 87, 244 P .3d 224, 231 (2010). The decision whether 
to exclude should be reached by an "exercise of reason." Id. 
The Commission declined to admit particular exhibits because Claimant's untimely 
exchange of documents with Defendants was in violation of J.R.P. Rule 10. Claimant did not 
provide any explanation of why she failed to timely produce the exhibits except that she 
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attempted to vacate the hearing to allow additional time to produce exhibits. The Commission 
noted that Claimant's additional evidence was discoverable prior to the time of the hearing. 
Defendants propounded Interrogatories and Requests for Production seeking such information on 
August 23,2010, one year and nine months before the hearing. Proposed Exhibit 2, pages 47-57, 
contains medical records from 2011, which were not exchanged with Defendants until two days 
before the May 10 hearing. Similarly, the proposed Exhibit 12, pages 48-69, was untimely 
exchanged and never disclosed in connection with Defendants' discovery requests. Because the 
proposed Exhibit 12 contained treatment from 2009 to 2011, it certainly could have been 
developed and produced in a timely manner. Claimant's proposed Exhibit 19 was not exchanged 
with Defendants until the day of the hearing, leaving Defendants no opportunity to review the 
same. The Commission concluded that it would not grant a rehearing for the purpose of 
supplementing the record with evidence available prior to the hearing. The Commission noted: 
Allowing evidence such as that contemplated by Claimant would lead to 
prolongation of the proceeding for rebuttal and possible surrebuttal of the parties 
after a final decision has been issued. Not only could the additional evidence have 
been discovered prior to the hearing, JRP Rule 10, requires that Claimant serve 
these proposed exhibits on Defendants within the time required prior to hearing, 
to prevent undue surprise. Claimant failed to exchange her proposed exhibits in a 
timely manner, and has not persuaded the Commission to revise the ruling on 
proposed Exhibits 2, 12, and 19. 
R., p. 103. 
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E. THE COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT CLAIMANT IS NOT ENTITLED 
TO ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE §72-804 IS NOT AN 
ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
There is substantial and competent evidence to support the Commission, and as such the 
Commission did not abuse its discretion in failing to award Claimant attorney's fees. Claimant 
was paid all medical benefits related to the work injury. She was paid all income benefits. 
Claimant failed to produce evidence, her burden, for entitlement to additional medical benefits 
and impairment. It is hard to discern what Claimant maintains is an unreasonable denial of 
benefits when there is no entitlement thereto. 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission findings are based upon substantial and competent evidence. 
The Appellant merely asks the Supreme Court to re-weigh the evidence. 
The Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion. 
The Industrial Commission orders must be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this"""'W,-- day of December, 2013. 
for Respondents 
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